Second, this episode and the likely response of India will end a period of peace relating to cashmere since 2019, then in 2021, when the two parties agreed from a ceasefire on the other side of the control line (LOC) in cashmere. Pahalgam's attack upset the concept of “normality” having returned to the cashmere valley, the government led by the BJP wishing to use the state of cashmere state ended in October 2024 as proof of the end of violence and large -scale terrorism in the state.
Third, despite enormous pressure to respond militarily, India would be concerned about how to calibrate it, given the possible reprisals of Pakistan, climbing and international pressure. The 2019 episode has demonstrated the dangers of such an escalation.
While India would like to limit hostilities, it is in the interest of Pakistan to let things intensify – to a limited extent – and to handle the prospect of the use of nuclear weapons to encourage third -party intervention. Pakistan has historically tried to internationalize the cashmere conflict while India has always insisted that it is strictly resolved by the two countries.
Pakistan has already warned that blocking or diversion of allocated water would be an “act of war and responded with all the force through the complete spectrum of national power”.
The United States has traditionally asked both parties to be cautious against spiral hostilities. This time, The Trump administration supported India The day after the attack, but he did not criticize Pakistan.
China has urged the restraint on both sides, but supported Pakistan's request for an impartial international investigation into Pahalgam attacks while Pakistan denies any involvement in the attacks. An Indian military strike risks increasing international pressure against it, led by Pakistan and China, especially if hostilities do not end quickly.
